9/11 and Mumabi Attacks were “Inside” Jobs (Part 1)

 Pakistan’s former ISI Chief General Hamid Hul talks to ALEX JONES

Alex Jones: Well, ladies & gentlemen, out of the gates, we have Gen. Hamid Gul, and of course he was the head of Pakistani intelligence ISI back in the 1980’s, he went on CNN on one of their international programs and talked about the fact that he believed 9/11 was an inside job, and that the Mumbai attacks, formerly Bombay, were also an inside job.

Mumbai Attacks, an inside job

As you know, we have detailed that that was a False Flag attack, carried out by western intelligence, clearly, in India, as a pretext to start World War III between the two nations. There were also calls, the Pakistani government said were officially made, confirmed with the phone records, from the Indian Foreign Ministry, saying “we are going to attack you”, attempting to trick the Pakistanis into launching some type of attack, and that almost happened.

So, for the next thirty minutes I’m very honored to be joined by Gen. Hamid Gul, and General, joining us from Pakistan, thank you so much for coming on with us today.

Hamid Gul: You are welcome.

Alex Jones: Uh, just out of the gates, I was told by your son that you were not happy with the CNN interview, that they edited you. So, you’ve got the floor, sir. We’re not going to edit you. You are live, so tell the world what is really going on.

Hamid Gul: Well, at the moment, we have to look at this human — great human tragedy that took place in Bombay. I sympathize with India; they’ve been rocked very badly. And their response was a bit nervous. They want to go to war with Pakistan if Pakistan does not behave or does not hand over whoever they want from us. They have given a list of people.

But I think that there has been a long record of the Indians accusing Pakistan whenever something like this happens, and in the past they have turned out to be every time wrong. Of course Pakistan is willing to cooperate. And I think that is a very good position that President Zardari has taken, that “you provide the evidence and we will try them out; we will arrest them we will put them to trial, and you can come and watch, see, and let the international cameras come and see. And there shall be a transparent, open trial, and if that does not satisfy you, then what else will?”

So, this is the situation where we stand today: there is an ominous tack from India, and America seems to be partly patting them on the back, and asking Pakistan to do whatever India is demanding. Now this is an unfair position, because India is not like America. America demanded from Pakistan back in — after 9/11 to cooperate and hand over anybody that Pakistan could lay their hands on. Seven hundred or so people were caught in Pakistan, they were sent to Guantanamo Bay, to Baghram and to Kandahar jail. And nothing came out — Khalid Sheikh Mohammad was the only one who was tried in that case: all others have been let off.

So, to get innocent people like that, just because you accuse them, and you don’t even provide the evidence, you pick them up and shove them in jails, this is not on [misses ]. I think that this belittles the values that particularly democracies uphold, and they talk so much about. And so I think that my son-in-law putted it good enough, and today Pakistan backed down on some of the defunct organizations — in fact these were banned in the year 2002, immediately after 9/11, but there could be some maverick elements among them who would still — I won’t rule out, could carry out uhhh [bumper music begins in background]— in — uh, on their own or in conjunction with some other forces ["partic"??] that kind of atrocities. But we have to wait and see, how it goes.

Alex Jones: OK, Mr. — uh, Mr. Gul, General Hamid Gul, please stay with us. We’re gonna break and come back in a long segment, uh, plenty of time for you to break down what’s going on, the serious tensions, uh being, un being risen due to what happened a few weeks ago in India. Please stay with us.

Alex Jones: Reading from Wikipedia, “General Hamid Gul, served as director general of Pakistan’s Inter Service Intelligence, ISI, during ‘87-’89, mainly in the time when Benazir Bhutto was Prime Minister of Pakistan. He was instrumental in the anti-Soviet support of the mujahideen in the Afghan War, ‘79 to ‘89, a pivotal time during the Cold War, and the estab — ” and it goes on. And we have him on line with us. We of course yesterday played the CNN, uh, TV interview that he did. This is live, and is not edited. Going back to him in Pakistan we’ve tried three different lines, this is the best one we have, we apologize our audio is not very loud to him, not very audible, and his back to us is very, very broken up. But we nevertheless have him joining us, we’re very thankful.

9/11 too, was an inside job, says the General & explains, how!

Uh, sir, continuing, on the CNN program, at least what they edited you to say, you talked about 9/11, the evidence being that nine eleven was an inside job, and the attacks in Bombay, now Mumbai, of a few weeks ago, that the evidence was, it was an inside job. Can you go over the evidence that you believe that these were
False Flag events, sir, and why these False Flag events are being staged.

Hamid Gul: Are you talking about 9/11?

Alex Jones: Yes, sir.

Hamid Gul: Well, I have my own reasons, you know, Rod Nordland was the CNN reporter here, I think he was based in Islamabad at that time, and he came to me immediately after 9/11, and his version that, uh, that I put out, it was given to the Newsweek, and unfortunately it was blocked, but it appeared on the internet, on the website of the Newsweek. And you can see it, I think it is dated 16th or 17th of September, 2001. [Note: the article is Prejudice In Pakistan: Why Is Islamabad Reluctant To Pressure Neighboring Afghanistan Into Turning Over Osama Bin Laden?, by Rod Nordland, dated 9/14/2001].

And in that I had said the same thing, and I still maintain that that’s my position. I have ["seven"??] reasons for it:

a. that 9/11 took place on the American soil, not a single person has been caught inside America, even though for doing such a job I think a huge amount of logistic support is required in the area where such operation is carried out.

b. Secondly, the air traffic control, when they saw the four aircraft were changing direction — going from east coast to west coast where they were headed, they started traveling in different directions. And it is quite amazing that for a very long period of time the air traffic control did not report this, nor did the US Air Force act in time. If, er, one were to calculate from the first flight, when it took off from Logan, till the first aircraft, and the solitary aircraft that took off was an F16 that took off from Langley, which is CIA headquarters, instead of one of the operational bases. So many of them are available in that area. And then a single aircraft never takes off, because we have been told that whenever the aircraft scramble they scramble in twos. And the time that it took was enormous. It took a hundred and twelve minutes! A hundred twelve minutes is a very long time in which to react. Was the US Air Force sleeping? And if it was sleeping, which heads will roll?

c. Second [NB: his third point] it was a huge intelligence failure, and no heads have been rolled, nobody has been taken to task, not a single person has resigned for this.

d. Thirdly, the air traffic control should have been rehashed, they should have been turned inside out, but nothing of the sort happened.

e. And finally, how come this is a coincidence that all transponders did not work, and it is not possible — and the direction is changed and it is not noticed?

f. Secondly, the US Air Force has the ability, because in the past whenever a plane has been hijacked, the record is that within seven minutes the US aircraft has been on the wing of the hijacked aircraft. In this case it — uh, it did not happen. The US alert system is so high, and it is so sophisticated, that if a missile were to take off from Moscow, and were to head toward New York, it takes about eighty minutes. And the US Air Force, and the missile systems, is supposed to intercept it within nine minutes — that means only Atlantic: around the Pacific it must stop that missile from coming in.

The system is in place, but it didn’t work, and nobody tried to question this.

g. Lastly, no inquiry has so far been held formally into the incident, and the whole world has been turned upside down, so many people have been killed, the American economy is going into a meltdown, and everything is gone wrong with the world, and yet no formal inquiry has been ordered by the US government. So I really don’t know. There are so many questions which hang in the balance.

h. And then to top it all, they say that [Obama Hamodu??(Hani Hanjour)] took the training by light aircraft in the army for six months, he could have maneuvered a jumbo 745 — uh, 757 from a height where it was traveling — that height was 9,000, and it came within seconds to a height of 1000, and then went straight into its target. Now this is not possible for a person who has been trained on a light aircraft to be able to do this.

Alex Jones: Yes, sir.

Hamid Gul: And there is no mention of the second aircraft, and so there are a number of things which remain unanswered.

Alex Jones: Yes, sir.

Hamid Gul: Whenever the journalists come, and visit me here, and I ask them these questions, that “why haven’t you taken the answers about this?”, and they say that “Patriotic Act comes in the way”, and we are not supposed to ask that question”.

Alex Jones: General — we are talking to General Hamid Gul, the former head of Pakistani ISI, during the key period of fighting the Russians, he was also, before he was the head of ISI, one of the chiefs according to our media, running operations against the Russians. And of course working with the United States closely, as well as the Saudi Arabians, and the British. Y’know, if that’s incorrect, correct me.

And staging 9/11 has its motives

Uh, General Gul, what are the motives? We have the PNAC, with Dick Cheney saying we need a Pearl Harbor event, we have 44,000 US troops massing in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in the days before 9/11, we have Bush on September 10, Newsweek reported ordering the launch of attacks the next week, we have, of course, the buildings being blown up with explosives, and all of the witnesses to that, now the government admits that Building 7 did fall in freefall, was not hit by a plane — specifically, sir, motives. Why would the Military Industrial Complex controlling the United States, why would they stage a 9/11 attack?

Hamid Gul: Well, I think there’s also the Cold War, when the — Reaganomics it was known as, the inflation was very high, and, domestic issues had to be addressed, but, uh, Bill Clinton, [two and hammose??] they really amassed a lot of money, American economy went booming, and he left a lot of money, and the — hard boys, Cold Warriors, when they came in they — they found that the situation was ready, they had money and they had resources, and they looked upon the conquest of the world, for which there was an opportunity window.

The Muslim world was lying prostrate, Russia was not still picking up from the — it’s foreign position, China was not ready yet, and therefore they looked upon it as an opportunity to go and do the [forming??]. And in this, I am a soldier, and I know that there has to be a single aim, but they mixed up the aims and they have botched up everything. First they said that they would go into such specific areas where there was no US presence before, as — such as the western Asia and South Asia — South Asia, where there was no American [???] present, and they wanted it there.

They had to keep the Chinese off from getting into the Middle East, they had to lay their hands on the energy tap of the world, which presently lies in the Middle East, but in future it will be in Central Asia, and so Afghanistan is the gateway to Central Asia, and finally to suppress any resistance, particularly which could threaten the state of Israel.

Now that is where they, instead of pursuing the American objectives, they started pursuing the Israeli objectives, and that is where they went wrong. You have to pick out a single aim, that is the first principle of war, and I don’t know why the generals and the politicians of America, they could be so naïve and so ignorant, that they started mixing aims, and they went into this war, without a buildup, without particular preparation, and without the American support behind them.

Because if they had gone to war, and asked for the support of the American people, they would never given them their support. So they had to create a pretext, and this was the pretext that they created.

Alex Jones: General, we’re gonna break in a second, and come back for the final segment. I’m hoping I can get you to stay a little longer, because I want you to speak unedited to the American people and the people of the world. I want to shift gears into Mumbai, what happened in India. Clearly the evidence of even the Indian intelligence chief, as you know, was saying that the Indian government was staging terror attacks on the train, an army captain was caught doing that and arrested, the chief of anti-terror was threatened, he was killed that day when it started in Mumbai, now they have caught an anti-terror police officer giving cell phones to the supposed terrorist that they’re saying came from Pakistan, we know the West is deeply in bed with some of the blocks of the former mujahideen, uh, can you speak to that?

General?

Hamid Gul: Can you hear me — I can’t hear you properly, can you hear me all right?

Alex Jones: Yes, sir, I can hear you. When we come back, we will s  — we will speak to what happened in India. Did you hear that?

Hamid Gul: Yes, yes, yes, yes.

Alex Jones: Good. Why they are staging terror attacks there, the evidence of False Flag/Inside Job in India. So when we return after this quick break [music begins] with the former head of Pakistani intelligence, uh, General Hamid Gul, joining us from Pakistan. I am coming to you from Austin, Texas, hence the phone troubles. We will work on those, sir, during the break. My websites of course are InfoWars.com and PrisonPlanet.com.

Stay with us, we’ll be right back with this exclusive interview.

[break]

[bumper music: Leonard Cohen —
Everybody knows the dice are loaded
Everybody rolls with their fingers crossed
Everybody knows — the war is over
Everybody knows the good guys lost

Contd…

Dueling Partners: Pakistan and America

Tariq Ali, The firebrand student leader of yesteryears, a source of enlightenment, guide and a teacher for today’s generation

An Interview with Tariq Ali

Interviewer: Wajahat Ali, Editor, GOATMILK: An intellectual playground 

Illustrator: Emmanuel Sliva

A country once callously shrugged off as India’s “lesser” neighbor now commands global attention and scrutiny as the next, crucial battleground in the never ending “war on terror. A much respected and prolific commentator, author and critic Tariq Ali observes in his new book “The Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power,” the selfish, inequitable relationship between both countries has far reaching, historical roots directly contributing to the tenuous geopolitical stability of modern day Central Asia. 

In this exclusive interview, Tariq Ali, a seasoned journalist and Pakistani insider, focuses on all major players, including the US Administration, Zardari, Bhutto, Musharraf, the Pakistani military, and a self centered and oppressive elite as prime contributors to Pakistan’s current volatility. 

W. Ali: 

Let’s start with a quotation from a PPP [Pakistan People’s Party] spokesman, Farah Naz Ispahani, who recently wrote in the Wall Street Journal:

“Zardari is the best hope for Pakistan. Mr. Zardari suffered 11 years in prison on politically motivated charges without having been convicted. He went on to lead his party to victory in democratic elections and then skillfully helped to craft a viable democratic coalition. As president he will lead our nation decisively forward in its transition to a stable democracy.”

What’s your response to that quote? 

Tariq Ali: 

My response to that quote is that it’s fantasy politics. The only reason Zardari is where he is, is because of whom he was married to [Benazir Bhutto.] It is well known - even within People’s Party circles – that had Benazir Bhutto survived he would’ve had no role whatsoever within the government. He is a figure who was wanted in Swiss courts for money laundering and corruption. He is someone who has, over the years, utilized his wife’s Prime Minister-ship on two occasions to become one of the richest people in the country. And to present him as the best hope for Pakistan is an incredibly sad reflection on the state of Pakistan. 

W. Ali: 

At the same time we’re seeing Obama’s intention to continue working work with Zardari, though US officials are also meeting the other guy Nawaz Sharif. My question is why at all did the US warm up to a man with such a dubious past? 

Tariq Ali:

Well because they put him in power. They did a deal with his wife. They hoped he would fulfill the terms of that deal. It would be very surprising given that Pakistan is supposedly a crucial ally in this so called “war against terror” that they would not work with Zardari. I hope Obama and had McCain been the president – both were aware of his checkered track record and the fact he is not very popular in the country.

It has to be remembered he was elected indirectly by the parliament and the national assembly. Were there to be direct elections of the presidency in Pakistan and were they to be free, it is unlikely Zardari would win. That’s the first point. The second point is that as far as the US is concerned essentially there is only one serious institution in Pakistan and that is the Pakistan army. They have done business with this institution for a long period of time, and the Pentagon knows fully well this is the only institution that they need and on which they have to rely in that country. So, officially, Zardari will be the official president, but the main force of the country remains the army.

W. Ali: 

Aren’t we seeing some tension right now? Zardari remains mostly silent on America’s offensive, which kills civilian people more than it does the al-Qaeda guys especially the pilot-less drones which carry out multiple missile attacks in FATA. Pakistan said US didn’t ask their permission. General Kiyani had harsh words for US, and America pretty much said they will do what they have to do to battle extremism. How will this tension play out between the Pakistani military, the United States and Zardari? 

Tariq Ali: 

Well, I think the tension is between the US and the Pakistan military. Zardari will probably be the fall guy, that is if the tension mounts and were there to be something as foolish and irrational as a US troops entering Pakistan, then the military would be forced to resist. So then what Zardari wants or doesn’t want or what deal he made is completely irrelevant, because at that point the army would be in charge.

You know the way the largest 5 star hotel in Islamabad, the Marriott, was blown sky high. It was incredibly well coordinated. I’ve been to that hotel. The security there is incredible. So how that has happened, it remains to be seen. But certainly they’ve created the impression that Pakistan is becoming ungovernable.

W. Ali: 

Steven Hadley, the head of the NSA, made an interesting comment: “Pakistan is not equipped to combat the militant threat.” He said this officially. What is the repercussion of that? Do you believe it first of all, and does Pakistan need outside help? 

Tariq Ali:

No, I think if the Pakistani military wished to do it they could certainly crush the organizations. But then again it is something controversial within the army. A) these people are citizens of Pakistan; B) every time the army has engaged action against them a lot of innocents have died; C) whenever the military has attempted to do this, it has created tension inside the military especially amongst the ordinary soldier and junior officers who say they don’t like killing their own people.

So, there is a problem with the Pakistani military doing this. However, were the US to go in and try to do it, they’ve met similar results: they’ve killed innocents, women; children have died. People not connected in anyway to the militants have died. Presumably, I assume we have no real information that some jihadis have died as well. But to transform the North-West Frontier of Pakistan into a large killing field isn’t going to help anyone. Essentially what we are seeing is spillage from the Afghan war, a war that has gone badly wrong. And a war which is being supported by consensual politicians of the Democratic and Republican parties of the US; a war which the politicians contending to power have not paid serious attention to.

W. Ali:

Several say that Central Asia, and not Iraq, is the major hot zone right now and needs to be contained. What can be done to destabilize the Taliban who are resurgent both in Afghanistan and now Pakistan? Isn’t any type of offensive going to cause a significant reaction in the form of violence for both countries? 

Tariq Ali:

Well, look; I don’t accept that Iraq is quiet. There still are the US raids that kill lot of innocents in that country. And the notion that even Petraeus isn’t saying that the surge is succeeding for all time to come, that there is still a great deal of unrest. The majority of Iraqis don’t want foreign bases there at all. It’s not that Iraq is being pacified successfully; it would be an illusion to imagine that.

However, it is true that the presidential contenders are concentrating on Afghanistan. But here we have a classic situation, a military occupation led by NATO, led by the US, which is killing too many civilians in its bombing raids. I mean even [Afghan President] Karzai has said too many civilians are being killed. Secondly, you have Hamid Karzai and his cronies running Afghanistan. A situation in which Karzai’s brother is reputed to be the country’s largest drug smuggler and arms bearer. [A situation] in which the people around Karzai are milking the country, milking the money coming in, milking the foreign agencies; growing rich at the expense of the bulk of the population, which has made the occupation very unpopular for all these reasons.

The result of this has been a big rise in Pashtun nationalism. And this rise in Pashtun nationalism takes the form at the moment of swelling the ranks of the old Taliban, which is why it is being called the neo-Taliban by many, many British observers on the ground. They see the composition and character of this organization has changed as a result of the NATO occupation, that is what is going on and the support for the neo-Taliban is increasing every single day. In order to confront this, it is no use that the US and the West say it is the fault of Pakistan.

I’m not saying the Pakistani state is exempt from all blame, it probably isn’t. But the central issue is the war inside Afghanistan going badly wrong and expanding this war into Pakistan won’t help matters; it would make it much worse. Pakistan is much larger country than Afghanistan, it is a country of 200 million strong with nuclear weapons, so it’s foolish to try to destabilize this country.

W. Ali: 

Here’s a question many don’t ask. Talk to me about the future response of China and Russia. They are bordering countries that have a vested interest. What should we see, strategically, as their next move in the region? 

Tariq Ali: 

The NATO officials, including the NATO Secretary General, are very open with what they say. They say we’re in Afghanistan for geo political reasons and military reasons. This is a strategically open country which borders China, Central Asia, i.e. Russia and Iran: three crucial countries for the US for different reasons and that there is no way we’re leaving here. This has been said, by the way, publicly and written about that the occupation is not about good governance or even about destroying Al Qaeda or wiping out Al Qaeda.

In effect, we know the Western countries and Western agents are talking to Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan regularly to try and see if a deal can be sorted out. The Taliban is refusing to play ball until the foreign troops withdraw. Behind all this is a view to try to create a government which would accept foreign military bases in Afghanistan in perpetuity – which no one wants. I mean Karzai has agreed to that but he is not the most popular figure in the country and were Western troops not there he would fall very quickly and that is the problem. And Russia and China is very angry, and so is Iran at the notion that Afghanistan could be occupied permanently or semi permanently. They have been talking to each other about it and the Chinese have made this very clear to the Pakistani military as well

W. Ali: 

In your book, it seems to imply that since the beginning of Pakistan’s nation-state, Jinnah and his advisors have been following a policy dictated by the US, in the sense that in their relationship, the US has been the one giving the orders and Pakistan has been the one following it. Has this been the case from the beginning and is this what has led to our current situation? This type of mentality? 

Tariq Ali:

What I argue in my book is that for the first two to three years, it was the Pakistani elite which was pursuing the United States. Because most of the people in charge of Pakistan for its first 10 years were people who collaborated with the British, politically and militarily. And once the British left Pakistan, they were desperate for someone else to replace [them]. I cite chapter and verse of the pleas made to the United States in ’47, ’48, ’49, but turned down by the US, who regarded India as a much more important power.

Then, with the heightening of the cold war, and the Indians becoming the central players in the Non-Aligned Movement, then Pakistan was, more or less, taken over by Washington and incorporated in all the security beds along with Iran and Turkey.

Since that time, the Pakistani military has been a very prominent player in the country’s politics. And I sort of argue in my book that Pakistan, being on the flight path of American power from the ‘50s onwards, has actually wrecked the organic development of politics in that country, leading to one crisis after another.

Now, after the end of the Cold War, the US abandoned both Afghanistan and Pakistan and left them to their own devices. That was the period in which Benazir Bhutto pushed through the Taliban takeover of Kabul, the Pakistan army got what they called a strategic depth, because without logistic support, there’s no way a ragtag army like the Taliban could have taken Kabul. This is a well-trained force, including many Pakistani officers and soldiers.

Now, with 9/11, the US is back in the region again and the Pakistani military, which had gotten used to taking some of its own decisions, had to cow tow to them. And this is what began to create the tensions inside the country. During the time when the Pakistanis were strong, staunch allies in the war against the Russians, as is well known, that is the time that all these jihadi groups were spawned by the state and sent in to fight in Afghanistan.

W. Ali: 

We both know the Pakistani mentality when they’re talking about whoever is running the country, they say, “At least he’s the lesser goonda [thug/gangster] than the other.” That seems to be the psyche of the people. Explain to me how Pakistani people can rise up and restore a semblance of a functioning democracy. Or is it impossible? Should we not expect this in the near future? 

Tariq Ali:

I don’t think so. I think that one of the things you pointed out, a side of Pakistan, which was very under covered in the Western media for a variety of reasons, was the big constitutional movement led by lawyers to demand the separation of the judiciary from the government, as exists in the US Constitution. This movement grew and grew and grew. And Musharraf’s strike against the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on two separate occasions just fueled this movement.

In its initial stages, this movement was crushed, not by the Army but by Zardari, who split the Supreme Court, refused to accept the Chief Justice back and got some of the other chief judges of the Supreme Court, who had also been sacked, to break ranks and come back. So this movement suffered a very heavy blow at Zardari’s hands.

But what it showed was a desire on the part of the people for a different order. And there is no doubt in my mind that that is what the people of Pakistan want. But unfortunately, the political parties on top who represent them are corrupt to the core. Most of them – all the major parties – are corrupt.

Now you have a situation, again which I haven’t seen reported in the Western media, that the party of the Bhutto family, the PPP as its official name is, is negotiating behind the scenes with these politicians from Gujarat, who were the lynchpin of the Musharraf regime, pleading with them for a coalition so that they can get rid of the Muslim League Sharif brothers’ government in the Punjab. So it’s back to business as usual in that country and it is extremely depressing because the country is at a critical state at the moment.

W. Ali: 

It is disappointing that we have the same players. You mentioned Nawaz Sharif in Punjab, who now seems to be spearheading democracy even though his record doesn’t reflect that. And we have Zardari and the PPP, again another feudal dynasty. And we have the Pakistan military. Are these the three players who the US has to play with now? 

Tariq Ali:

They are the three players. There’s no one else on that level in the country. By the way, Nawaz Sharif is not a feudal guy at all. He represents urban business interests. That has always been. They are not a landed family. The PPP still has a great number of landlords in them, especially from Sindh, but not exclusively. And the Army – these are the three players in Pakistan. You know, there’s no good wishing… of course I wish there were others. These are the people there at the moment and so whoever is talking to Pakistan has to talk to them. You can’t avoid it.

W. Ali: 

A statement made by many in the West, and also many Pakistani expats is, “See, we should have kept Musharraf. If we had Musharraf, this wouldn’t have happened. Even though he wasn’t the best, at least he fought against the extremists.” What’s the truth in that statement? What’s the legacy of Musharraf in your opinion? 

Tariq Ali:

Well, I think the legacy of Musharraf is very mixed. It’s not the case at all that he could deal with the militants. Essentially he reached an agreement with them. “Don’t hit us and we won’t hit you.” After the three attempts on Musharraf’s life, that’s basically what happened. These people were called in and were told, “Keep away from us and we will keep away from you and maybe the time will come when we will need you again to do something else.” So the notion that Musharraf was very effective in this regard was, of course, completely false. Secondly, once Musharraf had imposed a state of emergency on the country, just to remove the judiciary from the Supreme Court, his standing completely fell. There was no one who wanted him to stay on. His own power base in the Army no longer existed, because he had been compelled to leave the Army and get out of his uniform. So he was led to be stranded. The only people who kept him in power was the United States. And John Negroponte said that he wanted Musharraf to stay in power at least as long as Bush was in the White House.

But then behind the scenes, a big factional struggle erupted within the American establishment with Cheney’s office and (Zalmay) Khalizad negotiating directly with Zardari, sidelining Musharraf and helping organize the campaign which removed him without informing the State Department, which created real anger. If you read Richard Boucher’s e-mail of Khalizad, it’s very clear that he was very angry at what was being done.

I think the reason Khalizad got rid of Musharraf was that Musharraf and Khalizad’s protégé in Kabul, Hamid Karzai, loathed each other. Musharraf made no secret of it. And Khalizad probably felt that in Zardari, he could have another Karzai figure. Because given the charges against Zardari in a number of foreign courts and his assets abroad, he is a perfect creature for the United States because they can control him.

W. Ali: 

You have an interesting quotation in your book, which says, “Pakistan has a permanent insecurity complex regarding India.” How do you define that and how will that play out in current affairs, which are very volatile of course? 

Tariq Ali:

I mean the fact is the Pakistani elite certainly has [an inferiority complex.] Interestingly enough, the last big opinion poll survey in Pakistan carried out by the New America Foundation found that a majority of people regarded the United States as the biggest danger to world peace and only 11 percent of the population regarded India as the enemy. This represents, as far as India is concerned, a massive shift, which I think is very positive. My argument is that Pakistan should shift from Washington time to South Asia time. The future of the subcontinent requires a degree of commonality and collaboration between all the South Asian powers to build that region and help solve some of its problems. That is what needs to be done.

But this permanent enmity with India is dangerous. It’s dangerous for India and Pakistan as nuclear powers. War that is fought between them could easily generate into a nuclear conflict leading to millions and millions of deaths. I think this is recognized now by both sides.

W. Ali:

Last question. Let’s discuss the rise of “fundamentalism” in Pakistan. Pakistan is a religious country. People do espouse religious and spiritual beliefs. How do you see the role of religion being played in Pakistan and how should it be played? 

Tariq Ali:

I think that Pakistan as a Muslim state is beyond dispute. The bulk of its population are Muslim. But the fact is that the dominant image of Pakistan in the West is that of jihadi terrorists threatening to take over the nuclear facilities is just wrong. The bulk of the country is not in favor of jihadi terrorism. It’s been made clear in election after election.

The religion of people in the countryside in the Punjab, in Sindh is essentially still, to a large extent, a reflection of Sufi existentialism, of each one finding the Creator as an individual, general hostility to organized religion as such, which is still strong in the countryside. It’s your middle and upper-middle classes, like those in India and, not to mention, the United States, who become very religious, attracted to religiosity, joining the Tablighi Jamaat organizations.

But the common people don’t show any signs of that. A tiny minority is attracted to jihadi terrorism, but given the size of the country, this is infinitesimal. So the real problem that confronts Pakistan is not a big rise of religion, but the total and complete failure of a corrupt and callous Pakistani elite to do anything for its people.

The education system is languishing. The health system barely works. There are problems of shelter. There are now large problems of feeding the population with the price of wheat extremely high. We have the UN statistics which tell that malnutrition has reached such levels that 60% of Pakistani kids born are being born stunted. This is the real problem confronting the country.

Unless we have a government that is capable of dealing with this, the country will continue to be in crisis. There is real anger now at the gap between the haves and the have nots, between rich and poor in the country. And it spills over into violence at the slightest excuse. People are really angry now about this. 

Courtesy: http://goatmilk.wordpress.com/2008/10/01/dueling-partners-pakistan-and-america-an-interview-with-tariq-ali/

Defeat stalks Pakistan’s accidental president

A year of civilian rule in Pakistan has little to show for itself.

by James Lamont

Expectations ran high when President Asif Ali Zardari took power. Pervez Musharraf, his military predecessor, had lost his way as he wrestled with the constitution and the courts. The powerful and respected army watched its popularity sink as a mood of “Good riddance, Musharraf” took hold. A civilian alternative in the shape of the newly elected Pakistan People’s party promised stability, greater accountability and a step towards regional peace.

 But Mr Zardari, mocked by the Pakistani media for his Cheshire cat-like grin, cuts a demoralised figure. He has had to make a humiliating climb down in the face of protests by lawyers and the opposition. An Islamist insurgency is unchecked. The economy is weak; the country’s finances are propped up by an International Monetary Fund rescue package.

 The president’s tawdry track record speaks of inaction and wanting leadership. He needs to act fast and reassure his people and their international allies, who backed a return of civilian rule that he is up to the job.

Focusing minds is the preparation of a US aid package for Pakistan that puts it in the same class of recipient as Egypt and Israel. Washington was clearly distressed that the political leaders and legal establishment were engaged in riotous squabbling. Larger tasks are at hand, such as keeping the Taliban from the gates.

“Mr. 10 per cent”, as Mr Zardari was nicknamed during his late wife Benazir Bhutto’s time as prime minister, was already a curious choice of recipient for Barack Obama’s foreign policy largesse. But his choice of confrontation over compromise, risking violence in the capital city, hardens the view that he has a poor ear for political survival. Bad advice by trusted cronies to stand his ground was only overruled at the 11th hour by Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, the powerful army chief, and anguished calls from Washington and London.

Even before his capitulation to lawyers and his arch rival, opposition leader Nawaz Sharif, Mr. Zardari’s government gave the impression of being unable to turn the tide. Above all, it was burdened by a fight against Islamist militants that it felt was unwinnable. The sense of defeat is now perilously close to home. Mr. Zardari is locked in a debilitating power struggle with Mr. Sharif.

The president’s reluctant restoration of Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhary, a chief justice sacked by Gen Musharraf, may lead to the Supreme Court stripping Mr. Zardari of enhanced powers he inherited from Gen. Musharraf.

The Bhutto brand is at low ebb. Voters brought the PPP-led government to power in a sympathy vote following the killing of the charismatic Ms. Bhutto. Since then, Mr Zardari has done little to disprove critics’ view that he was anything other than an accidental president.

 There are a few bright spots. One is that the military, which has ruled Pakistan for most of its 62 years, has stayed in its barracks. Gen. Kiyani appears in no hurry to take over the reins of government in spite of the dire run of events. A second is the promise of a more productive relationship with the US through the mediation of Richard Holbrooke, Mr. Obama’s special representative to Pakistan and Afghanistan.

But if he is to have any chance of turning his administration around, Mr. Zardari needs to put in place an able executive team and cut loose toadying cronies. Then he needs to address fast three points.

 First, the government must revitalise a slowing economy, bedevilled by investment deficits in sectors such as energy after years of neglect under Gen. Musharraf.

Second, Mr. Zardari needs to accelerate engagement with the US to extend government control of lost border areas.

 Third, a delayed donor conference is a chance to build consensus among international partners and articulate how the country might rise from the mire.

 Even meagre success would relieve the pressure at Mr. Zardari’s back. But he may not be up to it.

Source:

Reconciliation Urged in Pakistan Crisis

(Left) Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani

by Pamela Constable

Pakistan’s ruling party, which narrowly survived a meltdown last month in the face of massive street demonstrations, is working to regroup and regain credibility despite the weakened position of its top leader, President Asif Ali Zardari.

Many Pakistanis hope Zardari, who was forced to capitulate to a coalition of opponents last month and reinstate a group of deposed senior judges, will rise above his personal defeat and reach out to forge a permanent reconciliation, especially with his arch rival, ex-prime minister Nawaz Sharif.

“If we want to succeed against extremists and terrorists, we must get our house in order,” Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi told the journalists. “I appeal to both the ruling party and the opposition to seek reconciliation. If we continue on the path of confrontation, it will do us great damage. We must strengthen democracy to have a strong foreign policy.”

But analysts and critics within Zardari’s Pakistan People’s Party said they feared that the president, who has remained mostly silent and invisible since the crisis erupted, will resist mending fences with Sharif and leave Pakistan politically adrift at a time of severe threats from Islamist extremists and a gravely ailing economy.

Sharif, the leader of a faction of the Pakistan Muslim League, threw his weight behind a national lawyers’ movement to restore the judges ousted by former military ruler Pervez Musharraf, and ended up as the campaign’s triumphant champion. Sharif has said he would like to reconcile with his longtime adversary, though just mid March he was calling for a “revolution” against him.

As for Zardari, critics here described him as isolated, surrounded by a few hawkish advisers and unwilling to face facts. They noted that only under intense pressure from the army chief and the United States, a major source of economic and military aid, did the president agree to restore the judges and call off plans to forcibly thwart a mass protest scheduled by his opponents on 16^th last month in the capital.

“Mr. Zardari is in a bunker, and party workers feel disillusioned and disconnected. Our party has always been populist, but now it is dominated by power politics,” said Safdar Abbasy, a senator from the PPP who broke with the president last week after police began arresting opposition activists. “What Mr. Zardari needs to do is sit and reflect on the need for reconciliation and stability in our society. It is all up to him.”

Abbasy is one of half a dozen senior party members, including Sen. Raza Rabbani and former information minister Sherry Rehman, who resigned from their posts recently. The country’s leading opposition lawyer, Aitzaz Ahsan, is a lifelong PPP stalwart, but has never supported Zardari.

One thing the dissidents have in common is a strong devotion to the memory and ideals of Zardari’s late wife, former prime minister Benazir Bhutto, who was assassinated in December 2007. They view Zardari, a businessman with a reputation for corrupt dealings and a short temper, as a poor substitute who has damaged the party and the country.

In contrast, the star of Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani, once viewed as the president’s yes-man, has risen rapidly during the recent crisis. In private, he was reported to strongly oppose the government’s crackdown on the opposition. In public, he was the reassuring figure who appeared on television in wake of the proposed long march to announce that the judges would be restored and the ban on public rallies would be lifted. Now, some in PPP circles see Gillani as a potential savior of the party.

“While Zardari’s democratic credentials have been severely undermined, Gillani has gone from being seen as a puppet to looking like a statesman,” said Rifaat Hussain, a professor of security studies at Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad. If the judiciary reverses a constitutional amendment imposed under Musharraf that expanded presidential authority, it would reduce some executive powers and benefit the prime minister. Otherwise, Hussain said, “Zardari’s shadow will continue to color everything.”

One key difference between the two officials is over how to deal with Sharif. Zardari, whose family rivalry with Sharif goes back decades, engineered several judicial and executive actions last month to reduce Sharif’s political power, including imposing emergency rule on Punjab province, his stronghold.

Gillani, emphasizing the need for stability, has publicly called for those measures to be reversed, and Sharif has suggested that he would be willing to rejoin the governing coalition if the government drops its effort to control Punjab and implements a “Charter of Democracy” that Sharif signed with Bhutto before her death. However, Zardari is said to be resisting.

Analysts said that one lesson from the political crisis was the need to replace personality-driven politics with stronger civilian institutions. At a time when the nuclear-armed nation faces a growing menace from armed Islamist extremists, many Pakistanis and foreign observers were dismayed to see the country’s two political dynasties at each other’s throats again.

“This is the time to move away from the politics of individualism,” said Abbasy. “We have been struggling to build a parliamentary democracy for a long time, and the movement to restore the judiciary has changed the country’s psyche. Today Zardari may be president and tomorrow somebody else, but people want to make sure our institutions are strong.”

The best bulwark against the threat from extremist groups, analysts said, would be a unified government that included secular parties like the PPP and more religiously conservative parties like the Muslim League. But if the government remains weak and divided by partisan conflict, they said, it will offer violent Islamists another opportunity to exploit.

“Groups like the Taliban thrive in a vacuum of power,” said Iqbal Haider, a dissident PPP senator and lawyer. “Restoring the independent judiciary strengthens the government’s hand to confront terror. If we can also end this political polarization and implement the Charter of Democracy, it will further strengthen our ability to confront the fanatics in our midst”.

Source:

Losing the Horse

Zardari will not get a second chance

                by Zafar Hilaly 

Mr Zardari will not get a second chance. His past and present unpopularity make him an easy target. To make matters worse Washington is disillusioned. With him at the helm they felt they could ‘drone on’ without too much of an outcry. Now they know they can’t.

Mr. Zardari had no option but to agree to the restoration of the judges. Or, to be entirely accurate, he did have an option. He could have refused to restore the CJ and then jumped from the second floor of the Presidency when the 111 Brigade or the demonstrators came for him.

 Any fool knows that. So why are his minions trying to pass it off as an example of his statesmanship? Would it not be better to admit that Mr Zardari erred and inject a sliver of candour in the tissue of lies that has marked the government’s stance?

 Why did Mr Zardari wait till matters reached a pass that only abject surrender could bail him out? There are only two explanations: bad judgement or bad advice. If, the former, Mr Zardari is beyond redemption (in a democracy there is no room for on-the-job training); if the latter, heads should roll.

 Ayub Khan in a similar situation in 1965 acted decisively. He sacked ZAB, Aziz Ahmed and Nazir Ahmed, perhaps his closest advisers, for advising him that “Operation Gibraltar” in Kashmir would not lead to war with India.

 Of course, Mr. Zardari will do no such thing. He is street-smart but not wise. Besides, he prefers to be known as dost ka dost; that counts for more with him and his flock than being termed mulk ka dushman by some hack. But that is how he will be remembered if he continues to heed the counsel of his politically illiterate advisers or backs his own uninformed hunches.

 Today, Mr. Zardari is a political pariah, even more so than Musharraf on the morning of November 3, 2007. Nothing but boorishness was expected from a soldier; much greater were the expectations from the husband of Pakistan’s foremost democrat who should have learnt his politics at her feet. Were an election to be held today Mr. Zardari would be unelectable, such is the infamy he has earned.

 Instead of turning a crisis he inherited into an opportunity to win public acclaim, he traded it for a disaster. In sum, his performance on the judges’ issue has been one of mind-boggling ineptitude.

Some believe that nevertheless his hold on the PPP is vice-like because the PPP is a Bhutto malkiyat and Mr. Zardari commands it on behalf of Bilawal. Not so. Mr. Zardari is an accidental President and he is not a Bhutto.

 You don’t become a Bhutto by marrying one. The suffix ‘Bhutto’ tagged on to a name is not enough. Bilawal will discover this. To be a Bhutto you must act like one, think like one, and believe like one. Anyway, even a Bhutto has to win his spurs. Zulfikar did so by wiping the floor off his opponents in a fair election in 1971 and going to the scaffold bravely; Benazir did it by returning in 1986 and 2007 and staking her life on the restoration of democracy; in Mr. Zardari’s case, far from winning his spurs, he has lost his horse.

Mr. Zardari will not get a second chance. His past and present unpopularity make him an easy target. To make matters worse Washington is disillusioned. With him at the helm they felt they could ‘drone on’ without too much of an outcry. At least that is what Ambassador Haqqani assured them.

 Now they know they can’t. Their political cover has been blown. They have had to fall back for support on their old ally, the fauj which may wish to oblige but cannot with the same abandon it once did. The concept of Long Marches has changed all that. Wisely though Washington is now hedging its bets.

 Mr. Nawaz Sherif now bestrides the political stage like a colossus. The richest and most privileged man ever to champion the cause of the poor and underprivileged; who owns more land in London than most of his better off supporters do in the pauperised villages of Pakistan

. Sitting on his gold (leaf) encrusted sofa in Lahore, beside crystal vases filled with mellifluous flowers of all hues, with walls and floors reflecting the opulence and bad taste of a successful business buccaneer, he waxes on about the prospects of an impending revolution that will banish poverty and bring justice to the door step of the impoverished with no idea how incongruous is the setting or how outlandish he sounds.

 Surely he should at least look the part he claims to play. It may have cost a lot to keep Gandhi in poverty, as Sarajoni Naidu said, but it was worth it.

 Mr. Sharif’s panaceas for our problems are not novel: to reason with the extremists but, if they remain unreasonable, to seek the shelter of a verbose and diffuse Parliamentary Resolution; to espouse the tolerant, progressive Islam of Jinnah but when confronted by the opposition of bigots to take a time out, or pass the buck or better still keep mum; to support the American alliance but if politically inexpedient to guard his silence; to befriend the Government and at the same time to distance himself from them; to detach Mr. Gilani from Mr. Zardari but when confronted to deny any such motive; to defend the Supreme Court and, when necessary, attack it, etc, etc. The contradictions are profuse.

 When the Long (Container) March ended, and the CJ was restored and the time came to take stock what emerged was what we all knew, which is that the military remains the dominant force in Pakistani politics and that our politicians are as fork-tongued and as incompetent as any soldier when it comes to keeping promises or running the country.

Sadly, nothing has changed. Pakistan remains in a free fall mode. The only question is whether when Pakistan hits the ground we will be merely battered and bruised, or dead. Take your pick.

Source

IN THE NEWS

People Power Prevails: Deposed CJ Reinstated

Lahore, March 16, 2009

Deposed Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry is expected to be reinstated to his position as part of a series of steps to be taken by the ruling PPP to end a confrontation with the lawyers and opposition led by PML- N that had triggered a major political crisis.

The decision to reinstate the Chief Justice, who was removed from his office when former military ruler Parvez Musharraf imposed emergency in November 2007, was announced by the Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani early this morning. The decision has been taken after due  consultations with PML-N Chief Mian Nawaz Sharif and Barrister Aitzaz Ahsan, a  leading figure of the lawyers community, who spearheaded the movement to restore the deposed C.J.

PML-N spokesman Siddique-ul-Farooq told reporters that his party had been informed that Chaudhry was being reinstated through an executive order.

The decision was announced by Gilani during an address to the nation 5.50 PST in the morning today.

The move came after former prime minister and PML-N chief Nawaz Sharif defied restrictions imposed on him and led thousands of his supporters in Lahore to join a long march organised by lawyers and opposition parties to press the Pakistan People’s Party-led government to restore the deposed judges.

Nepal and Pakistan: Lessons for the USA

By Swaraaj CHAUHAN

The other day I came across a very fine, sober and critical evaluation of the happenings in Nepal and Pakistan. Swaraaj Chauhan on the editorial board of a website titled “The Moderate Voice”, has posted this piece. I reproduce it for the readers of WOP.

Comments by Swaraaj are very apt in the Nepal and Pakistan context. Yet to throw some more light on the whole scenario, I have added my own comments and feelings in parenthesis.

N.H.

 Nepal and Pakistan provide good lessons in foreign policy to both Barack Obama and John McCain. The democratically-elected new Prime Minister of Nepal, Prachanda (photo above) who led a 10-year guerrilla war, now professes that his country’s era of “capitalist democracy” has begun. He was sworn in by Nepal’s first president, Ram Baran Yadav.

Lesson No. 1: The president or prime minister of any country must not be sponsored / pushed by the USA to remain friendly. Good diplomacy is making friends out of enemies. [May this work for India and Pakistan as well].

Lesson No. 2: If the USA looks for, and sponsors, loyal and subservient leaders in the world, the public in that country would rise against their own subservient/sponsored leaders and the USA.

Lesson No. 3: It is a dangerous foreign policy to bribe foreign leaders / dictators and tempt them to follow the US policy. [It miserably failed here in Pakistan where US's overt and covert support to a dictatorial one man regime did neither any good to Pakistan nor to the United States. More than 10 billion US$ doled out to Musharraf, could not help put a lid over a never ending terrorism in Pakistan; it did on the other hand generate more sympathetic layers of people finding solace in outfits like al-Qaeda and the Taliban]. Only myopic policy needs to find supporters abroad with the help of bribery. Corruption would ultimately corrode the democratic functioning in the USA itself. Unaccounted billions of dollars went to the Musharraf regime. In the end the USA has become a staunch enemy of both militants and the Pakistan public.

Lesson No. 4: To turn an enemy into a friend needs patience and sincere efforts. In other words SINCERITY and PERSEVERANCE. The BUSH-MUSH strategy of BLUFF and BLUSTER ultimately boomerangs. It also empowers / strengthens terrorism.

Lesson No. 5: NEVER take foreign policy decisions / actions unilaterally. There is the United Nations. Only dictators act unilaterally. [Again Musharraf's is a typical case of this bitter but dangerous fact]. The USA has lost much credibility with its actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even in Afghanistan there should be UN troops, if at all. The US will never be able to justify (or get results) by only taking NATO forces. The Musharraf tangle was solved when the US involved Britain, Saudi Arabia and other countries for parleys.

Lesson No. 6: If my neighbour has begun to treat his family violently, I can only call the police. I can’t force my way into my neighbour’s house and then tell him that I am going to stay there for years to prevent violence (as in Iraq).

Let’s come back to Nepal. After months of bickering among the political parties, a huge majority of the assembly has elected a former rebel as prime minister who wore Western clothes (another first) but made a gesture to national custom by donning a traditional Nepali cap.

“It has been an astonishing transformation. For over a year the Maoists have been part of Nepal’s transitional government, heading ministries and becoming ambassadors. Many poor Nepalis will wonder whether, after ten years of war costing 13,000 lives, the Maoists will now sink into the comforts of power and prestige and forget them.

“The Maoists will have to prove them wrong. Their election manifesto called this the era of capitalist democracy in Nepal and stressed that the private sector is intrinsic to their plans. More immediately Prachanda must reassert the authority of the state, which has been badly eroded over the past two years as crime has spiralled and ethnic groups clamoured for their rights.” [Same goes for Zardari and Gilani combination here in Pakistan; where condition is far more dangerous, Govt's writ is getting shrunk every day and people are feeling lost. Country's northern tribal belt which was always a peaceful area barring few incidents of tribal warfare is up with arms against the central authority.

Things are pretty bad in this land of the pure but all is not lost. Pakistani people have demonstrated  tremendous resilience in the past. They can do so now as well. The nation can meet the pending crisis but the challenges are colossal and it is now a test for Zardari-Gilani duo to prove that they can steer a course out of  this challenging scenario, so that people can convince themselves they made a sensible decision while they voted the party of BB to power].