Pakistanis have turned to a Muslim identity which in itself is quite OK for the country is an Islamic republic. But to put all onus on religious identity alone, deprives the country of its own national genesis. Without a cultural identity there remains hardly any difference between people of the same faith living in different parts of the world.
·
PAKISTAN’S IDENTITY CRISIS
·
Waris Hussain
·
The recent outburst of homegrown terrorists from the Pakistani-American community is an alarming development, especially considering the tenuous relationship between Islamabad and Washington. The central issue seems to be why Pakistani-Americans are turning to such violent organizations.
The answer is not so simple, and while many point to the racism and xenophobia of American society that alienated these individuals, I believe the problem started in Pakistan. The national identity of Pakistan has been replaced by a religious one, and this identity crisis has siphoned down not only to Pakistanis, but also their children who were born abroad.
Zahid Ibrahim wrote this week in Express Tribune that the New York Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad, turned to terrorism because the apparent hostility of American society towards Muslims. Mr. Ibrahim claims that if these young people like Shahzad could espouse their extremist Islamic rhetoric in the public sphere openly, they would not turn to violent terrorist groups. While I agree with Mr. Ibrahim that American culture must open itself up to its immigrant populations, the question still remains as to WHY these individuals, specifically Pakistani-Americans, espouse such religiously extreme ideals.
For many who move to America or were born here of Pakistani descent, they experience an identity crisis because they want to assimilate but are also viewed as representatives of Pakistan. But what happens when the country you are supposed to represent lacks any national or cultural characteristic? Indian-Americans, regardless of their religious beliefs, represent Indian culture with its music, literature, and films Yet, Pakistanis, have turned to the Muslim identity and the concept of Ummah rather than explore their own cultural identity.
This paradigm has affected me, as I would have arguments with my father about how Pakistan is in the same category as other Muslim nations across the world. My ideal of Pakistan being merely a part of the Ummah was emblematic of Pakistan losing its own cultural identity for that of the “Muslim World”. Individuals from my father’s generation are infuriated at the thought of Pakistan forgoing its own identity because it delineates from the vibratant social and political life they experienced growing up in Pakistan.
One should not confuse my distinction between Ummah and Pakistan’s national identity, as an attack on the concept of Ummah. I believe there are several examples of how this Ummah has helped Pakistan as well as other nations in times of poverty or war. However, we see the violent effects of this concept being the ONLY one learned by individuals, without an understanding of the tradition and culture they belong to as Pakistanis.
The misperception of national identity was no more apparent to me than when reports surfaced of a group of American-born Pakistanis being arrested in Pakistan for conspiring to commit terrorist acts. The most striking part of the report was that it stated the Pakistani-American men did not even speak Urdu and were joining the jihadi movement. This raised a red flag in my mind considering these young men did not have any idea of their cultural heritage, but followed the modern religious trend towards extremism and violence nicknamed international jihad.
The solution to me is not allowing these confused individuals space in our public sphere to discuss extremist rhetoric, but to look to each and every immigrant home. The conversations occurring within these homes are where this seed is sown for these young individuals to understand their roles not only as Americans, but as Pakistanis. If all they hear on the news and all they are told by their parents is that Pakistan is part of the Ummah and they only owe duties as a religious follower, they will fall in the trap of extremism far more easily.
However, if one discusses the ideals of secular governance by Jinnah, or talks about the poetry of Iqbal, or mentions the history of Sufism in Pakistan- they fully understand their own identity and Pakistan’s. These discussions would remind Pakistanis of their vibrant national history and could bring new creativity to the nation.
More significantly for immigrants and their children, understanding modern philosophical and artistic movements helps them adjust to American society, which has also experienced similar movements of freedom. Thus, the understanding of Pakistan’s identity as part of the Ummah denies a true understanding of the complexity of the culture and can lead to a rise in extremist thought.
_______
Source: Wichaar, Title image: The Pakistan Update
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the ‘Wonders of Pakistan’. The contents of this article too are the sole responsibility of the author(s). WoP will not be responsible or liable for any inaccurate or incorrect statements contained in this post.
YOUR COMMENT IS IMPORTANT
DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE POWER OF YOUR COMMENT













McChrystal calls Marjah a ‘bleeding ulcer’ in Afghan campaign
In this critical phase of the Afghanistan war, Gen. Stanley McCrystal says NATO and Afghan efforts to secure Marjah are moving too slowly. ‘By day there is government. By night it’s the Taliban,’ says one Afghan tribal leader.
·
McCHRYSTAL GETTING IMPATIENT WITH MARJAH CAMPAIGN
·
Dion Nissenbaum
·
Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top allied military commander in Afghanistan, sat gazing at maps of Marjah as a Marine battalion commander asked him for more time to oust Taliban fighters from a longtime stronghold in southern Afghanistan’s Helmand province.
“You’ve got to be patient,” Lt. Col. Brian Christmas told McChrystal. “We’ve only been here 90 days.”
“How many days do you think we have before we run out of support by the international community?” McChrystal replied.
A charged silence settled in the stuffy, crowded chapel tent at the Marine base in the Marjah district.
“I can’t tell you, sir,” the tall, towheaded, Fort Bragg, N.C., native finally answered.
“I’m telling you,” McChrystal said. “We don’t have as many days as we’d like.”
The operation in Marjah is supposed to be the first blow in a decisive campaign to oust the Taliban from their spiritual homeland in adjacent Kandahar province, one that McChrystal had hoped would bring security and stability to Marjah and begin to convey an “irreversible sense of momentum” in the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan.
Instead, a tour last week of Marjah and the nearby Nad Ali district, during which McClatchy had rare access to meetings between McChrystal and top Western strategists, drove home the hard fact that President Barack Obama’s plan to begin pulling American troops out of Afghanistan in July 2011 is colliding with the realities of the war.
NOT ENOUGH TROOPS IN HELMAND
There aren’t enough U.S. and Afghan forces to provide the security that’s needed to win the loyalty of wary locals. The Taliban have beheaded Afghans who cooperate with foreigners in a creeping intimidation campaign. The Afghan government hasn’t dispatched enough local administrators or trained police to establish credible governance, and now the Taliban have begun their anticipated spring offensive.
“This is a bleeding ulcer right now,” McChrystal told a group of Afghan officials, international commanders in southern Afghanistan and civilian strategists who are leading the effort to oust the Taliban fighters from Helmand.
“You don’t feel it here,” he said during a 10-hour front-line strategy review, “but I’ll tell you, it’s a bleeding ulcer outside.”
Throughout the day, McChrystal expressed impatience with the pace of operations, echoing the mounting pressure he’s under from his civilian bosses in Washington and Europe to start showing progress.
Progress in Marjah has been slow, however, in part because no one who planned the operation realized how hard it would be to convince residents that they could trust representatives of an Afghan government that had sent them corrupt police and inept leaders before they turned to the Taliban.
A hundred days after U.S.-led forces launched the offensive, Marjah markets are thriving, the local governor has begun to build a skeleton staff and contractors have begun work on rebuilding schools, canals and bridges.
Marines are running into more firefights on their patrols, however. Taliban insurgents threaten and kill residents who cooperate with the Americans, and it will be months before a permanent police force is ready to take control of the streets from the temporary force that’s brought some stability to Marjah.
The U.S.-backed Marjah governor, Marine officials said, has five top ministers. Eight of 81 certified teachers are on the job, and 350 of an estimated 10,000 students are going to school.
CREEPING TALIBAN OFFENSIVE
In an attempt to contain the creeping Taliban campaign, Lt. Col. Christmas’ 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, in northern Marjah recently ceded direct control of an outlying rural area, collapsed its battle space and moved a company back into the population center, which had been neglected.
“There was no security,” said Haji Mohammed Hassan, a tribal elder whose fear of the Taliban prompted him to leave Marjah two weeks ago for the relative safety of Helmand’s nearby provincial capital, Lashkar Gah.
“By day there is government,” he said. “By night it’s the Taliban.”
Even in Nad Ali, where British commanders have had success holding elections, opening schools and building the beginnings of a functioning local government, there are significant pockets of Taliban resistance. The local police force, the British commander said, is about half the size that’s needed to patrol the area.
“What we have done, in my view, we have given the insurgency a chance to be a little bit credible,” McChrystal said in one meeting. “We said: ‘We’re taking it back.’ We came in to take it back. And we haven’t been completely convincing.”
Still, no one proposed sending more troops to Marjah.
GIVE TALIBAN MORE TERRITORY?
McChrystal’s top commanders in southern Afghanistan did weigh a suggestion from the top U.S. Marine general in the country, who said the time had come to gamble on turning over some areas to Afghan control more quickly than planned.
“I think if we want to shorten the timelines, then we are going to have to assume more risk in certain areas,” said Marine Maj. Gen. Richard P. Mills.
In the final briefing of the tour last week, one American civilian strategist told McChrystal that it would be hard to force Marjah residents to shed their skepticism quickly.
“The vast majority of people are going to be on the fence, and they’re going to wait,” said the U.S. official, who asked not to be identified because the meeting was meant to offer candid advice to McChrystal.
“The hard question for us is: Can we push them off the fence or do we have to wait for them? It will take time, and even if you throw two more battalions in there, it is still going to take months and months.”
“It was a long way gone; therefore I think patience is necessary,” said Mark Sedwill, NATO’s senior civilian representative in Afghanistan. “But I can quite understand why the sheer amount of attention created a sense of expectation that is hard to fulfill.”
The military shares the blame for generating great expectations about how fast the Marjah campaign could turn the tide against the Taliban, expectations that defense officials in Washington, speaking only on the condition of anonymity, said the Obama administration was eager to embrace.
In February, as the intense battles with Taliban fighters around Marjah were winding down, British Maj. Gen. Nick Carter, the commander of coalition forces in southern Afghanistan, told Pentagon reporters: “Looking downstream, in three months’ time or thereabouts, we should have a pretty fair idea about whether we’ve been successful. But I would be very cautious about any triumphalism just yet.”
Nearly three months to the day after making that prediction, Carter was sparring with McChrystal over whether they’d sent too few troops to seize Marjah.
“I think that we’ve done well, but I think that the pace of security has been slower,” McChrystal said in one meeting. “I’m thinking that, had we put more force in there, we could have locked that place down better.”
“I don’t agree with you about putting more forces in there,” Carter argued, reflecting the inherent tension between defeating the Taliban and winning over civilians. “This is about convincing people.”
“You’re going to feel that way,” McChrystal cut in with a deadpan joke. “It’s your plan.”
“I am, sir,” Carter replied. “You would have to put about five brigades in to achieve the effect you’re talking about and, even then, I bet the Taliban would get through, because it’s in the minds of people.”
Like other commanders throughout the day, Carter pleaded for patience.
“I think what’s going to make the difference, whether we marketed it right or not at the beginning, is time,” he said. “And it’s about persuading people.”
McChrystal appeared unpersuaded.
“I think we have let too much move along without overwhelming-enough security,” McChrystal said, “and I think we are paying the price for it.”
On the flight back to Kabul, McChrystal said he’d intentionally asked provocative questions about troop levels to light a fire under the team and to convey a renewed sense of urgency.
McChrystal now has 13 months to produce some elusive, irreversible momentum before Obama plans to start bringing U.S. forces home — and the president expects to stay on schedule.
“I am confident that we’re going to be able to reduce our troop strength in Afghanistan starting in July 2011, and I am in constant discussions with General McChrystal, as well as Ambassador (Karl) Eikenberry, about the execution of that time frame,” Obama said earlier this month during a joint news conference with Afghan President Hamid Karzai.
The tension between political and military timetables was apparent again Sunday, when the foreign minister in Britain’s new, Conservative-led government criticized withdrawal deadlines as counterproductive.
“I don’t think setting a deadline helps anybody,” Foreign Secretary William Hague told the BBC during a visit to Afghanistan. “I think so much of what we’re doing in Afghanistan, setting targets for people then to jump through hoops towards, doesn’t help them in their work.”
If there’s concern in global capitals, said NATO’s Sedwill, a former British ambassador in Kabul, it’s as much a product of inflated expectations as of unmet promises.
“If there are politicians anywhere in the alliance who are making a judgment that we shouldn’t have gone for the surge unless we could have been confident by the end of 2010 it would all look completely different, then we shouldn’t have gone for the surge, because that was never practical,” he told McClatchy.
Related Post: Marjah, ‘This not Falluja’.
________
Jonathan S. Landay in Washington and McClatchy special correspondent Hashim Shukoor in Kabul, Afghanistan, contributed to this article.
Source: McClatchy Newspapers
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the ‘Wonders of Pakistan’. The contents of this article too are the sole responsibility of the author(s). WoP will not be responsible or liable for any inaccurate or incorrect statements contained in this post.
YOUR COMMENT IS IMPORTANT
DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE POWER OF YOUR COMMENT
Wonders of Pakistan supports freedom of expression and this commitment extends to our readers. Constraints include comments judged to be in violation of WoP Comments Policy. We also moderate hate speech, libel and gratuitous insults.
- News, Views & Analysis
- Op-Eds
- Political Essays & Commentaries
on May 31, 2010 at 4:18 pm Comments (1)Tags: Afghanistan, Barack Obama, Hamid Karzai, Islam and Millitancy, NATO, Politics, Taliban, The War on Terror, US Foreign Policy, USA, Will US Win the War on Terror?